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Abstract 
The recent, much remarked upon decentralization in Bolivia produced four important changes in 
the nation’s public finances: (1) a sharp fall in the geographic concentration of investment; (2) a 
sea-change in the uses of investment away from infrastructure towards the social sectors; (3) a 
significant increase in government responsiveness to local needs; and (4) increased investment in 
poorer municipalities.  Existing theoretical treatments of decentralization cannot account for 
these phenomena.  This paper develops a model of government which relies on political 
bargaining between municipal representatives and central government agents over the allocation 
of public resources.  By invoking central government self-interest, I can explain the Bolivian 
experience.  Lastly I introduce the concept of residual power, which underpins the model, as key 
to understanding decentralization.  Analyzing the location of residual power in a political system 
can help cut through the thicket of contradictory claims that fill the decentralization literature. 
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1.  Introduction 
 A number of authors have commented recently on the large and growing trend 
towards decentralization across the world.  Campbell (2001), Manor (1997), Piriou-Sall 
(1998) and Smoke (2001), among others, document the efforts of literally scores of 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to devolve resources to lower levels of 
government and/or deconcentrate their administrations in various ways.3  And in Europe 
and North America too, decentralization occupies an important place in the policy debate 
under the guises of subsidiarity and federalism.  Such a widespread, vigorous enthusiasm 
for decentralization is predicated on proponents’ claims that decentralization can make 
government more responsive to citizens’ needs by “tailoring levels of consumption to the 
preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups” (Wallis and Oates 1988, 5).  By 
“bringing government closer to the governed”, decentralization is thought to make 
government work better (Ostrom et.al. 1993, Putnam 1993, World Bank 1994a, UNDP 
1993).  The opponents of decentralization, apparently in retreat everywhere, counter that 
the poverty, inequality, bigotry and ignorance of local government and local society 
distort public decision making so much that centralization is preferable (e.g. Crook and 
Sverrisson 1999, Samoff 1990, Smith 1985). 
 A curious paradox of this debate is that this strong international enthusiasm is 
unsubstantiated by empirical evidence.  The vast majority of scholarly studies on 
decentralization’s effects have yielded ambiguous results; in country after country, 
decentralization improved some aspects of public services, worsened others, and left the 
remainder largely unchanged (see Rondinelli, et.al. 1983 for an exhaustive review).  
Theoretical claims based on inductive reasoning from particular instances (i.e. cities, 
                                                 
3 Manor (1999) states that “over 80 percent of developing and transition countries… 
are experimenting with decentralization.” (p.viii) 
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regions) of success are not supported across larger samples – often from the same 
countries.  Such evidence is not encouraging, and does not support reformers’ continuing 
efforts. 
 An exception to this rule is Faguet’s (forthcoming) close study of the Bolivian 
experience, which finds that decentralization changed public investment patterns in ways 
which made government more responsive to real local needs.  Before decentralization 
national government concentrated investment in transport, hydrocarbons and energy in 
Bolivia’s largest, wealthiest municipalities.  After decentralization the country’s 
smallest, poorest districts redirected investment toward social services and agriculture, 
allocating it much more evenly throughout the national territory.  Even the most isolated 
municipalities benefited.  These changes were sufficiently strong to cause dramatic shifts 
in national investment aggregates. 
 The case of Bolivia thus provides an important, fresh starting-point for inductive 
theorizing about decentralization and how government works.  A useful theory of 
decentralization must be capable of explaining at least one case in which decentralization 
produced clear benefits.  This paper offers a model which can explain essential aspects 
of the Bolivian experience.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 
reviews Bolivia’s decentralization program, laying out the main policy changes that 
resulted as key stylized facts.  Section 3 uses game theory to develop a model of central 
vs. decentralized government, featuring political bargaining over public resources.  
Section 4 summarizes the results and draws out implications for the broader 
decentralization debate. 
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2.  Decentralization in Bolivia 
2.1 Popular Participation and the Decentralization Reform 
 Before 1994 Bolivia boasted one of the most centralized state apparati in the 
region.  The nationalist revolution of 1952 had mounted a state-led bid to modernize a 
poor, backward nation marked by extreme inequality and presided over by a “typical 
racist state in which the non-Spanish speaking indigenous peasantry was controlled by a 
small, Spanish speaking white elite, [their power] based ultimately on violence more 
than consensus or any social pact” (Klein 1993, 237; my translation).  Revolutionaries 
expropriated the “commanding heights” of the economy – land and mines – and 
mobilized the resulting public corporations in a determined drive to transform social 
relations and create a modern, industrial, more egalitarian society (Dunkerley 1984).  In 
government too, the President directly appointed Prefects, who in turn designated entire 
regional governments and associated dependencies.  This formed a national chain of 
cascading authority that emanated from the capital and was dedicated to breaking down 
provincial fiefdoms and the oligarchical power of the old elite. 
 Centralization increased throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as successive 
governments promoted the unionization of miners, laborers, peasants, public servants 
and professionals into a hierarchical “peak association”, whose representatives 
negotiated national policies directly with those of the private sector and government 
(Dunkerley 1984, 43).  Together these three planned the development of new industries, 
the exploitation of Bolivia’s natural resources, and sectoral and regional policy in a bid 
to orchestrate a rapid development process from the capital.  The military governments 
that overthrew elected administrations with increasing frequency from the 1960s 
onwards accelerated this tendency, as did the intellectual trends of the 1950s-1970s: 
Dependencia theory, Import Substitution Industrialization, and Developmentalism (Klein 
1993).  With political power so concentrated in La Paz, there was little point in 
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establishing the institutions and legal framework of local government.  As a result, 
beyond 30-odd regional capitals and provincial towns, Bolivian local government 
existed only in name, as a ceremonial institution devoid of administrative capability and 
starved for funds.  And in most of the country it did not exist at all. 
 Against this unpromising background, Bolivia’s decentralizing Law of Popular 
Participation – drafted quietly by a small group of technocrats – was announced in 1994 
to a skeptical nation.  It was met initially with surprise, followed by derision, and then by 
the determined opposition of an unlikely alliance representing a large segment of 
society.4  Introduced in January, the bill moved rapidly through Congress and became 
law in July.  At its core were four points: 
1. Resource Allocation.  Central government funds devolved to municipalities doubled 
to 20 percent of all national tax revenue, and allocation switched from ad hoc, highly 
political criteria to a strict per capita basis. 
2. Responsibility for Public Services.  Title to all local health, education, roads, 
irrigation, culture and sports infrastructure was transferred to municipalities free of 
charge, along with the responsibility to administer, equip and maintain it, and invest 
in new infrastructure. 
3. Oversight Committees (Comités de Vigilancia) were established to oversee 
municipal spending and propose new projects.  Composed of representatives from 
                                                 
4 “Injertos Tramposos en ‘Participación Popular’”, Hoy, 19 January 1994; “La 
Declaratoria de Guerra del Primer Mandatario”, La Razon, 27 January 1994; and 
“Arrogancia Insultante”, Presencia, 27 February 1994 are only three of the many 
articles which appeared in the Bolivian press documenting popular reaction to the 
“Damned Law”.  These are documented in Unidad de Comunicación (1995). 
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local, grass-roots groups, these comprise an alternative channel for representation 
and voice in the policy-making process. 
4. Municipalization.  198 new municipalities (out of 310) were created, comprising 
the entire national territory. 
 The reform ushered in a new era of local government for the vast majority of 
Bolivia’s cities and towns.  Where before the state was present, if at all, in the form of a 
military garrison, local schoolhouse, or perhaps a health post, each reporting to a central 
ministry, elected local government accountable to local voters suddenly sprouted 
throughout the land. 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 To fully understand the effects of decentralization in Bolivia, consider the 
changes in resource flows it catalyzed.  Figure 1 shows central and local government 
investment by sector for the periods 1991-93 and 1994-96 respectively.  During the three 
years before decentralization, central government invested heavily in transport, 
hydrocarbons and energy; during the three years following decentralization, local 
governments invested most in education, urban development and water & sanitation. 
Figure 1
Public Investment by Sector,
1991-93 v. 1994-96
Sector Central Local
Education 1% 29%
Urban Development 3% 29%
Water & Sanitation 4% 13%
Transport 31% 9%
Health 7% 6%
Energy 9% 4%
Agriculture 6% 4%
Water Management 1% 2%
Multisectoral 9% 2%
Communication 5% 1%
Industry & Tourism 0% 1%
Hydrocarbons 24% 0%
Mining & Metallurgy 1% 0%
TOTAL 100% 100%  
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 Figure 2 makes the pattern clearer by aggregating these thirteen sectors into two 
categories: “Social Investment & Urban Development” (education, water & sanitation, 
health, agriculture and urban development), and “Economic Infrastructure & 
Production” (transport, energy, communications, industry & tourism, hydrocarbons, and 
mining & metallurgy).5  The graph shows that decentralization coincided with a large 
shift in resources away from economic and towards social investment.  Whereas central 
government invested 77% of its resources in economic infrastructure, local governments 
chose to invest only 15% here and 85% in social investment and human capital 
formation.  This is the first stylized fact, and constitutes strong evidence that central and 
local government have very different investment priorities. 
Figure 2: Central v. Local Government Investment
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 The second stylized fact concerns the geographical distribution of investment 
across Bolivia’s municipalities before and after decentralization.  Figures 3-5 illustrate 
this by placing Bolivia’s municipalities along the horizontal axis and measuring 
investment per capita as vertical displacement.  A highly skewed allocation would 
                                                 
5 I exclude multisectoral, a hodgepodge that includes feasibility studies, technical 
assistance and emergency relief, that is difficult to categorize. 
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appear as a few points strewn across the top of the graph, with most lying on the bottom; 
an equitable distribution would appear as a band of points at some intermediate level.  
How does Bolivia compare?  Figure 3 shows that per capita investment before 
decentralization was indeed highly unequal, with large investments in three districts and 
the vast majority on or near the horizontal axis.  Figure 4 corrects for the skewing effect 
of the highest observations by excluding the upper twelve and showing only those below 
Bs.2000/capita.  Though the distribution now appears less unequal, there is still 
monotonically increasing density as we move downwards, with fully one-half of all 
observations at zero investment.  Central government policy was thus hugely skewed in 
favor of a few municipalities which received enormous sums, a second group where 
investment was significant, and the unfortunate half of districts which received nothing.  
Compare this with figure 5, which shows municipal investment after decentralization.  
This chart shows no district over Bs.700/capita, a broad band with greatest density 
between Bs.100-200/capita, and only a few points touching the axis.  Average municipal 
investment for this period is Bs.208/capita, and thus the band contains the mean.6  Thus 
central government – with a much larger budget and free rein over all of Bolivia’s 
municipalities – chose a very unequal distribution of investment across space, while 
decentralized government distributes public investment much more evenly throughout 
the country. 
 
                                                 
6 Investment sums here are much lower because they exclude central government 
funds. 
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Figure 3: Investment per capita, 1991-93
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Figure 4: Investment per capita, 1991-93
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Figure 5: Local Investment per capita, 1994-96
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 The third stylized fact come from Faguet (forthcoming), which uses econometric 
models of public investment to show that decentralization increased government 
responsiveness to real local needs.  After 1994, investment in education, water & 
sanitation, water management, and agriculture was a positive function of illiteracy rates, 
water and sewerage non-connection rates, and malnutrition rates respectively.7  That is to 
say, although investment in these sectors increased throughout Bolivia after 
decentralization, the increases were disproportionate in those districts where the 
objective need for such services was greatest.  Faguet argues that these changes were 
driven by the actions of Bolivia’s 250 smallest, poorest, mostly rural municipalities 
investing newly devolved public funds in their highest-priority projects. 
 The fourth stylized fact come from a companion paper (Faguet 2002), which 
uses a similar technique to show that centralized investment was economically 
regressive, concentrating public investment in richer municipalities and ignoring poorer 
ones.  Under decentralization, by contrast, local governments acted progressively, 
investing greater sums where indicators of wealth and income are lower.  These four 
stylized facts can be summarized as follows.  Under central government, public 
investment was: 
i. concentrated in economic infrastructure and productive activities, at the expense 
of social services and human capital formation; 
ii. concentrated in space, leading to a very unequal geographic distribution; 
iii. regressive in terms of need; 
iv. economically regressive – i.e. favoring wealthier districts. 
Under decentralization, the opposite patterns obtained. 
                                                 
7 Need coefficients have the opposite sign for urban development, and are 
insignificant elsewhere. 
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3.  Theory: A Problem of Agency and Control Rights 
 How can we explain these four facts?  We turn now to theory, and to the 
structural factors which can explain the differences between central and local 
government policy making. 
3.1 The Literature 
 The classic economic treatment of decentralization is Tiebout’s (1956) “A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures”, which spawned a large number of theoretical extensions 
and empirical applications.  Tiebout posits a world of well informed individuals who 
move costlessly amongst localities that offer different levels of provision of a public 
good.  Each locality finances its public goods through efficient taxation of local 
residents.  The ensuing competitive equilibrium in locational choices produces an 
efficient allocation.  But Tiebout’s paper makes no attempt to model central government, 
either as coexisting alongside local governments or as their precursor.8  Thus, although 
the efficient allocation it derives can explain needs-responsive local government – 
stylized fact (iii), the model can offer little insight into why the spatial and sectoral 
allocation of resources might differ between the two regimes; and its prediction that 
wealthier districts invest more under decentralization is contradicted by stylized fact (iv). 
 More generally, the highly mobile population and fixed governments at the 
model’s core are at odds with both anecdotal evidence from Bolivia and studies of even 
the highly mobile United States (Bardhan 2001).   A better assumption would seem to be 
that government is the mobile element in most local democratic systems, changing with 
relative frequency, whereas the population is essentially fixed over typical, four or five 
                                                 
8 Indeed, Rubinfeld (1987) and others have pointed out that Tiebout’s model is not 
really about decentralization at all, despite the large number of studies which interpret 
it that way. 
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year electoral periods.  European countries’ notably low rates of internal migration are 
consistent with this view.  Tiebout-style “voting with your feet” is surely a relevant 
mechanism for preference revelation at the margins, and may be more important for 
particular services, such as education.  But the principal mechanism for joining demand 
and supply for public goods must involve the political process.  Indeed this is arguably 
why local government exists at all.  This critique extends to a large part of the economic 
literature on decentralization, which does not engage with politics in any meaningful 
sense. 
 Oates (1972) builds on Tiebout by modeling central and local governments 
explicitly in order to examine heterogeneity in tastes and spillovers from public goods.  
Here, local government can tailor public goods output to local tastes, whereas central 
government produces a common level of public goods for all localities.  He finds that 
decentralization is preferred in systems with heterogeneous tastes and no spillovers; with 
spillovers and no heterogeneity, centralization is superior on efficiency grounds.  But 
Oates’ results rest largely on his assumption of uniform central provision of public 
goods.  This is contradicted by stylized fact (ii) – in Bolivia public investment actually 
became more uniform after decentralization.  And while this model would expect local 
government to be more responsive to local needs, it cannot explain why central 
government would be actively regressive in terms of both need and wealth.  A theory 
which does not restrict central government choice so strongly would appear to be 
preferable. 
 Besley and Coate (1999) provide a model in which this restriction is lifted.  Like 
Oates, they invoke uniform taxation to finance public goods provision.  But they devise a 
model of central policy-making in which elected representatives bargain over public 
goods provision in multiple districts.  For heterogeneous districts, they find that 
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decentralization continues to be welfare superior in the absence of spillovers, but 
centralization is no longer superior when spillovers are present.  They also find that 
higher heterogeneity reduces the relative performance of centralization for any level of 
spillovers.  Their underlying logic is that heterogeneity creates conflicts of interest 
between citizens of different districts.  This affects the selection and behavior of 
representatives, leading to degraded legislative performance in choosing public policies.  
This model is both more representative of how real central governments operate, and 
more in keeping with the facts of Bolivia’s transition to decentralization.  It is generally 
consistent with stylized facts (i) and (iii), less so with (ii) or (iv), without directly 
addressing any of them. 
 Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998) develop a model of public service provision 
which examines the implications of decentralization for the targeting and cost-
effectiveness of public expenditure.  They find that for provision of a merit good 
available on competitive markets to the poor, decentralization dominates with respect to 
inter-community targeting and cost-effectiveness, though not necessarily for intra-
community targeting.  For the provision of infrastructure, decentralization dominates 
only if local governments are not vulnerable to capture, local government has adequate 
financing, inter-jurisdictional externalities do not exist, and local governments have all 
the bargaining power vs. public enterprise managers.  This model can thus explain 
stylized facts (iii) and (iv), but not (i) or (ii). 
 And lastly Faguet (forthcoming) proposes a model of public investment in which 
local government can detect local needs more accurately than central government, but 
the center has a technical or organizational advantage (economy) in the provision of 
public services.  In this system, a given district will be better off under central 
government when the center’s cost advantage dominates its inaccuracy in ascertaining 
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local preferences; where inaccurate detection dominates, local provision is preferred.  
This model can explain stylized fact (iii), and perhaps (i), but not (ii) nor (iv). 
 More generally this model – and many others – assumes that resource allocation 
is essentially a function of external parameters, and the differences between central and 
local government do not have to do with the structure of government and the processes 
by which decisions are taken.  If central economies dominate, welfare will be maximized 
under central government as it disinterestedly distributes a bigger pie amongst districts 
according to its objective function, without regard to external considerations.  But the 
evidence above implies that a more sophisticated approach is needed to explain the 
Bolivian experience.  The fact that half of all Bolivian municipalities received no 
investment at all in the years before decentralization, even in sectors such as energy and 
transport where a priori we expect the center to have a cost advantage, suggests that 
policy is the product of a competition amongst interest groups, and that more complex 
institutional factors are at work than those proposed in most of these models. 
 This model builds a mechanism of political bargaining onto the simple 
framework of Faguet (forthcoming) in order to provide a more refined portrayal of the 
ways in which central and local governments interact.  It assumes the same political-
geographic context as Faguet, but diverges from it in the way it conceptualizes central 
government’s problem.  Here, central and local government are not mutually exclusive 
social planners with parametrically varying objective functions; rather both are 
immersed in a bargaining framework that explicitly models interactions between the two 
and permits Pareto-improving cooperation.  The choice between centralization and 
decentralization concerns the way each interacts with the other.  Specifically, under 
decentralization there is no policy cooperation between center and periphery, while 
under centralization mutually beneficial cooperation is possible but not assured.  
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Municipalities’ allocation of public goods under centralization is the result of bargaining 
in a national legislature in which a district’s representatives negotiate with central 
government officials, representing all other districts, in a zero-sum game9 centered on the 
public purse.  This mimics real-world political horse-trading, where central government 
politicians bargain with local leaders for political support in exchange for commitments 
of public expenditure, locally-favorable policies, or other political rewards in the center’s 
gift. 
3.2 The Model 
 A country is made up of T districts, each with population nj where subscript j 
denotes district.  Local welfare is defined as median utility, Umj = xmj + θmjb(gj), where 
θmj denotes local median preference for the public good g in district j, and xmj is the 
median consumption of private good x in district j.  The function of government is to 
provide public goods, which it finances with a local head tax.  Central government has a 
cost advantage in the provision of public goods, such that the head tax needed to finance 
a given level of provision under central government is αgj/nj with 0<α≤1, whereas the 
tax under local government is gj/nj.  This cost advantage can derive from various sources, 
such as central government’s superior technical knowledge, or an organizational 
advantage which lowers the cost of complex public goods, or traditional economies of 
scale.10  Hence central government’s unit price is lower than local government’s for a 
given quality of output.  Under central government each district has weight λj in the 
                                                 
9 The allocation of resources within central government is zero-sum, while the shift 
from local to central government is not. 
10 Certain types of public health interventions, for example, require specialized 
technical knowledge which central government may be able to obtain more cheaply 
than local government. 
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national parliament where policy is made,11 where λj ≥ 0 and Σλj=T.12  Local government 
ascertains θmj accurately, whereas central government ascertains θmj with probability p 
and θ-mj with probability (1-p).  Probability varies as p∈[0,1], and θ-mj is defined as an 
unrestricted value of θ other than θmj. 
 Each district j has a local government which coexists with central government, 
itself located in a particular district c.  Under decentralization all local public goods are 
produced by local government, and the central government dedicates itself to other 
pursuits.  These other pursuits may be thought of as “national public goods”, as in 
national defense, but they are extraneous to the model and not of concern here.  Under 
decentralization, local government’s problem in district j is 
 

 −
n
ggb
g
m )(max θ  (3) 
where for simplicity I drop all subscripts j.  Taking first-order conditions and re-
arranging yields 
 
mn
gb θ
1)( =′  (4) 
The level of public good provided by local government is thus an implicit function of θm, 
the median preference for the public good, and of the population n.  Citizens receive the 
level of public good that they prefer, which they pay for fully. 
 Under centralization, government takes on a cooperative form where the job of 
local government is to relay information on local needs to the center, while central 
government, with its cost advantage, produces public goods cheaply.  Central 
                                                 
11 In this framework policy is understood to mean the level of public good provided. 
12 Thus if central government gives a particular district, such as the capital, a large 
weighting, average λ<1 for all the remaining districts in the country. 
 15
government then allocates public goods across districts.13  I assume that central 
government’s cost advantage is an increasing function of the number of municipalities 
that cooperate with it, α=α(t), α′>0.  This follows from the characterization of cost 
advantage α, which will tend to increase in t whether we think of it as an economy of 
scale, technical knowledge or organizational ability. 
 Under centralization, districts’ locally-elected representatives bargain in a 
national legislature over the allocation of public goods.  Central government’s problem is 
represented by the Nash Maximand 
 ( ) ( ) *** λλ VVVVMax jjj −−  (5) 
where Vj represents median utility in district j under central government’s equilibrium 
allocation of g, and Vj represents the district’s outside option.  The negotiation takes 
place between a given district, j, and central government representing the rest of the 
country.14  The outside option is simply district j’s median utility under the decentralized 
equilibrium allocation of g, VjD, minus the cost of transition, kj, from a centralized to a 
decentralized regime.  V* is the sum of median utilities in the T-1 districts which 
comprise the rest of the country under centralization, and V* represents the sum of T-1 
districts’ outside options.  λ* is the sum of T-1 districts’ political weights.  That is to say, 
                                                 
13 This model is generally similar to Ostrom, et. al.’s (1993) polycentric model of 
government, where different public functions are allocated across hierarchical levels 
of government. 
14 In practical terms, central and local government can be thought to negotiate over the 
head tax hj which central government charges the residents of district j for the public 
goods it provides, where αgj/nj ≤ hj ≤ gj/nj.  The center keeps the difference (hj - αgj/nj) 
for itself. 
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 Transition cost k can be thought of as the cost incurred in returning to local 
production of public goods, including attracting outside technical experts, training local 
officials, setting up the infrastructure and organizations necessary to provide and 
administer local services, and the like.  I assume k is observable by both center and 
periphery.  Central government’s problem can thus be interpreted as a negotiation over 
how to divide the productive surplus from moving from local production to lower-cost 
central production of public goods.  Note that Faguet’s preference structure is retained 
here, folded into a bargaining structure. 
 Taking first-order conditions and re-arranging yields 
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Equation (6) shows that district j and the rest of the country divide the surplus in 
proportion to their respective political weights and the marginal utility of the public good 
in each.  Equation (7) states that the ratio of marginal utilities in district j and the rest of 
the country from increasing probability p is negative.  Hence a unit increase in the 
probability that θmj is assessed correctly, which by definition must improve welfare in 
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district j, must decrease welfare in the rest of the country – including district c where 
central government resides. 
 We can interpret this as an implicit cost of coordination which the center must 
incur to liaise with district j and use information on j’s preferences accurately.  Doing so 
reduces the size of the surplus, providing the center with an incentive to mis-assess local 
preferences.  Note that this is not an explicit assumption, but emerges from the structure 
of the model.  Thus in the aggregate, taking account of multiple negotiations, the center 
will tend to provide a policy mix different to that preferred by the T districts.  At this 
point the model can already explain stylized facts (i) and (iii) above – the shift in the 
sectoral composition of investment, and the increasing responsiveness to need. 
 Figure 6 illustrates equilibrium allocations under both centralized and 
decentralized regimes.  For convenience I assume λj=T/2 and draw the welfare frontier 
as a straight line.15 
                                                 
15 If λj is allowed to vary, then lines A´F´ and AF become curves. 
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Figure 6: Centralized and Decentralized Equilibria (for λ j = T/2) 
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Under decentralization, the equilibrium solution for district j and the rest of the country 
is located at point D (VjD,V*D).  The move from local to central provision generates a 
productive gain which shifts the welfare frontier (in terms of aggregate utility) out from 
A´F´ to AF.  Note that the size of the welfare gain (A´F´?AF) increases with central 
government’s cost advantage and decreases with the cost of coordination.  Triangle BCD 
northeast of point D contains all combinations of Vj and V* that are Pareto-superior to 
(VjD,V*D).  The two parties will negotiate over points in this triangle.  Line segment BC 
represents feasible allocation sets that Pareto-dominate all other sets in BCD, including 
the decentralized optimum D.  BC thus describes all of the solutions that can occur in 
equilibrium.  As the graph illustrates, the number of admissible solutions is infinite.  This 
is a product of the unstructured form that negotiation has taken thus far.  Adding a 
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simple structure along the lines of a Nash bargaining game permits the reduction of an 
infinite set to an equilibrium that is unique. 
A Nash Bargaining Game 
 Representing central government’s problem as a Nash bargaining game permits 
the incorporation of a participation constraint for district j, which provides the key to 
solving the model.  The game is structured so that the negotiation over dividing up the 
centralization surplus involves central government offering district j enough incentive to 
cooperate.  Three facets of the model are salient.  First, the fact that central government 
is located in a given district c implies that its employees live in c and benefit from the 
public goods available there.  Second, centralized production implies that the residents of 
c appropriate any part of the productive surplus not allocated to other districts in the 
country.  They hold residual power in this political system, a point to which we return 
below.  Locating central government in a particular district ensures it is selfish.  Third, 
the fact that α=α(t) gives central government an incentive to induce as many districts as 
possible to cooperate.  District j, meanwhile, seeks to improve upon its decentralized 
allocation VjD.  This combination of incentives generates a game in which the center 
offers districts the minimum allocation necessary to ensure the cooperation of the largest 
number, thereby maximizing its own allocation of public goods.   
 Bargaining takes the form of a repeated four-period, single-offer game.  
Negotiations between central government and all districts j occur simultaneously.  In a 
negotiation with any given district j, central government represents all T-1 remaining 
districts.  The four periods simulate a typical electoral cycle.  Centralizing agreements 
take effect with a lag of one period.  Defection from central to local government, 
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however, can take place within a single period.16  Districts know the number of periods 
between elections, and form their expectations about the next period’s allocation based 
on current and past allocations.  The structure of the game is as follows: 
steps Origination
0. The game originates.
1. Central government invites all decentralized districts j to join the “club” of centralized
provision of public goods, and offers to allocate gj.  The offer will only take effect in the
following period.
2. Decentralized districts j accept or reject the offer.
Periods 1 to 4
3. Central government allocates g to all cooperating districts.  Local
government allocates g to all non-cooperating districts.  All districts
under both regimes observe their allocations and all Vj’s are realized.
4. Districts under central government choose to remain or defect to local
government based on their centralized allocation of public good g.  In
districts under local government the decentralized equilibrium persists.
5. Steps (3) and (4) repeat during periods 2, 3, and 4.
6. The game repeats from step (1).
2, 3, 4
 
 The first three periods consist of decisions over allocation and 
cooperation/defection, with central government making new offers at the end of period 
four.  As the game is symmetric for all districts j, if one district chooses cooperation then 
all do, and if one district chooses decentralized provision then all do.  The fact that 
central government makes the offer gives it a structural advantage which appears to be 
realistic and in keeping with stylized facts from around the world (see discussion below).  
But it is important to note that district j has a significant advantage too – its ability to 
                                                 
16 Negotiation and coordination amongst numerous districts is assumed to take longer 
than a unilateral decision to return to local production of public goods.  This has the 
effect of increasing district j’s bargaining power compared to central government. 
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break agreement unilaterally at any time.  Between these two aspects of the model the 
latter would seem to be less realistic, making the model biased somewhat in favor of the 
periphery. 
With Credible Commitment 
 I initially assume that central government can credibly commit to gj from the 
outset of the game.  The solution to this problem is a standard result in game theory. 
Proposition 1:  If kj = 0, Vj = VjD = Vj.  The center appropriates the entire efficiency gain 
from centralization. 
 This is easily proven: District j has no incentive to accept a lower allocation than 
it receives under decentralization, and thus its payoff space has lower bound VjD.17  
Central government has no incentive to offer more than the VjD+ε necessary to obtain j’s 
agreement.  Equilibrium thus occurs at point B in figure 6. 
 Allowing kj to take on nonzero values increases central government’s bargaining 
power at the expense of j.  At cost kj1, the default allocation set (Vj,V*) shifts leftwards, 
suggesting an equilibrium at E.  With high cost kj2, kj2 > kj1, the implied equilibrium 
shifts back to A, with j’s welfare close to the origin.  But j will not accept offers at A and 
E, as both are below VjD.  Central government must offer a level of gj such that Vj ≥ VjD 
in order to secure the agreement of j, and we return to point B on figure 6.18  The result 
implies that district j can never improve on its decentralized optimum, VjD, despite the 
center’s cost advantage in service provision, credible commitment, and the possibility of 
                                                 
17 For ease of expression, I refer hereafter to g and V interchangeably as the allocation 
received under central or local government, although in strict terms g refers to the 
allocation and V to the resulting welfare. 
18 Note that this may entail a lower level of gj than under decentralization, as the unit 
cost of g may now be lower. 
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accurate preference assessment by the center.  Only district c can improve its welfare 
under central government.  The presence of credible commitment, however, does keep 
j’s welfare from falling below VjD despite non-zero transition costs. 
With Limited Commitment 
 Suspending the assumption of credible commitment changes the problem 
significantly.  If commitment is completely absent and all parties know this ex ante, 
cooperation will be impossible as individual districts’ expected allocation will be less 
under self-interested central government than under decentralization.  Local government 
will prevail.  Under different types of limited commitment, however, central government 
is possible. 
 The concept of limited commitment is problematic, however, as different 
limitations may inherently conflict with the very concept of a commitment that is 
credible.  Commitment with uncertainty, where the center commits to an agreed 
allocation of public goods which it can provide only with a given probability, is one such 
example.19  More generally, any form of limited commitment where the object of the 
commitment – in this case a level of gj – cannot be fully specified in advance should not 
be regarded as a commitment in the formal sense.  I focus instead on commitment that is 
limited in time rather than in kind.  For the sake of simplicity I examine commitment 
limited to one period in a multi-period game.  Such commitment is both credible and 
specifiable, but limited in that parties may only make promises about outcomes one 
period in advance.  This has practical relevance to the extent that it mimics negotiation in 
an uncertain political climate with shifting alliances.  Other, more sophisticated forms of 
                                                 
19 Following the earlier example, we can give this the form (πgj + (1-π)g-j), where g-j 
is some level of g other than gj and π is a probability, π∈[0,1]. 
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limiting commitment are possible, but for the sake of brevity I do not consider them 
here. 
Proposition 2:  The equilibrium solution to the repeated Nash game with limited 
commitment is for central government to offer district j an allocation such that  
Vj = VjD + 15/6 kj in period one, Vj = VjD – 1/3 kj in period two, Vj = VjD– ½kj in period three, 
and Vj= VjD– kj in period four. 
 The proof is as follows, and is illustrated in figure 7a below.  The game occurs 
over four-period cycles where agreement is implemented in period one, and negotiations 
are conducted over the following cycle in period four.20  Periods one to four thus 
represent the continuing sequence of plays where a stable equilibrium may be found.  
Analyze the sequence of plays in reverse, beginning with period four, for a repeated-
game equilibrium.  Once central government is implemented, j will defect if Vj < Vj, as 
by defecting it can achieve Vj immediately and VjD thereafter.  Hence central 
government will offer Vj= VjD– kj in period four.  In period three, however, the center 
must offer Vj > Vj, as an allocation of Vj in period three implies the same in period four 
and j is better off defecting.  Its decision to cooperate or defect can be characterized as 
2Vj = 2VjD – kj, and the center must offer at least Vj = VjD– ½kj for j to cooperate.  The 
offers for periods two and one are derived by the same logic.21 
 Limiting commitment in this way thus alters the stream of allocations that district 
j obtains from central government from an even pattern to one where public goods are 
                                                 
20 I consider this feature realistic, but the results are not sensitive to it. 
21 This is easily derived by equating 4VjD to the stream of centralized allocations. 
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front-loaded in the first period and then decrease steadily through the cycle.22  Aggregate 
welfare over the cycle is equal to that under local government, as well as that under 
central government with credible commitment.  But the temporal distribution changes 
significantly.  The experience of Bolivian municipalities under centralization, most of 
which saw investment levels vary wildly from large sums down to nothing, supports this 
result.  Once again, district j cannot improve on its decentralized optimum despite the 
center’s cost advantage and the ability to elicit accurate information on preferences, and 
only district c gains from centralization.  But the presence of limited commitment once 
again keeps j’s welfare from falling below 4VjD over the cycle.  Note that Vj rises with 
the cost of transition, leaving less for central government to appropriate for itself.  Note 
also that the solution’s parameters depend on the periodicity of the game, and that 
extending or compressing its temporal structure will increase or decrease equilibrium 
allocations accordingly. 
                                                 
22 Investment flows varying predictably with the electoral cycle mirrors the political 
business cycle literature (e.g. Alesina and Roubini (1992)), although derived from a 
different starting point. 
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 Figure 7 
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When the Center Can Renege 
 In many countries the question of central government submitting itself to an 
enforceable commitment, even a limited one, may be quite unrealistic.  By definition, the 
transition from local to central government involves not just a change in fiscal regime 
but a fundamental change in the allocation of political power.  Whereas before 
centralization the residents of j administered their own affairs, afterwards it is the central 
government that holds political power and administers resources on their behalf.  They 
are the government, they make decisions, they uphold rules as they see fit.  In countries 
where the legal and constitutional instruments for enforcing the center’s commitment are 
not available to counterbalance the pure political power of the center, making an ex ante 
commitment on allocation bundles which central government is bound to honor may not 
be possible.  Where checks and balances are weak, central government will have every 
incentive and complete liberty ex post to renege on its promise and increase its own 
allocation, and will face no sanction for doing so. 
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Proposition 3:  Where central government can renege on its commitment, district j’s 
allocation over the four-period cycle will be such that ΣVj = 4VjD – 2 1/12kj.  Districts will 
be worse off under centralization than under decentralization. 
 The proof is straightforward.  Once district j has joined central government in 
such a setting, we can expect the allocation in period one to fall to Vj = VjD – ¼kj, with 
allocations in periods two to four remaining the same as before (see figure 7b).  Under 
the logic explained above, district j will have no incentive to defect from centralization in 
any given period, but the center can renege on any offers of front-loaded benefits.  Hence 
in a context of a strong central government and weak countervailing powers brought 
about by a weak legal and institutional framework, self-interested central government 
will systematically under-invest in public goods in non-central districts by an amount 
that depends on transition cost k. 
 But this outcome depends on the center essentially fooling district j, convincing it 
to join central government and incur potential cost k in the absence of guarantees that the 
agreed Vj will be provided.  Why would localities agree to such a game?  I note first that 
district j will not agree to such a game if accurately characterized ex ante.  That it finds 
itself in such a situation is a product of the center changing the rules in mid-game, or its 
own ignorance or mistake.  But whatever the cause, assume path dependency obtains and 
in a given period district j finds itself in the midst of an inherited, welfare-inferior 
centralization scheme.  The question then becomes: why does the equilibrium persist? 
 With the payoff structure of figure 7b, j has no incentive in a given period to 
return to decentralization as its welfare will immediately fall in that period.  Over several 
periods, of course, a short-term loss will lead to a long-term gain, and j should defect.  
But timing may be crucial.  Elected officials in j – those responsible for the decision to 
defect – face a short time horizon given by the electoral cycle, and may have too high a 
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discount rate to incur the cost of a transition which will mainly benefit future politicians.  
If their electoral cycle does not coincide with that of central government, they might 
prefer to wait for a general election in the hope of faring better under new leadership.  Or 
they may take time to settle into office and comprehend their situation – and as the 
payoff to defection declines over time, they may not be ready to make such a decision 
until it is no longer worthwhile. 
 External factors may also intervene.  Defection may be perceived as less 
prestigious than remaining in central government, and might leave elected officials open 
to charges of political weakness, poor negotiation skills, etc.  Lastly, the center may offer 
local leaders opportunities for graft, future allocations of public goods, or other benefits 
if they cooperate.  These possibilities are all beyond the confines of the model, and some 
violate its assumption of rationality.  I will not pursue them further except to indicate that 
when surveying countries’ fiscal arrangements, a number of complex factors may help 
explain the persistence of low centralized equilibria when districts would be better off 
decentralizing. 
4.  Conclusions 
 This paper differs from most of the literature on decentralization in the way that 
it conceptualizes the role of central government.  Analytical models of decentralization 
typically treat central government as either an enlightened social planner (Oates, 1972), 
or a neutral forum in which the representatives of different localities vote (Pande, 1999) 
or bargain (Besley and Coate, 1999) over policy choices.  Here we treat central 
government as an independent political actor in its own right, with its own constituency, 
bureaucratic interests and policy goals.  Such an approach is common in the political 
science and public choice literatures on bureaucratic (budgetary) maximization (see 
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especially Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1965)), but has been ignored in the economic 
literature on decentralization. 
 The model shows that in a framework of legislative bargaining, where central 
government can provide public services more cheaply than local government and has 
access to accurate information on local preferences, districts on the periphery can never 
improve upon their decentralized allocations even when credible commitment is 
possible.  And without commitment districts are worse off under centralization as the 
center hoards the resource pool. 
 By modeling central government as an independent actor analytically distinct 
from local governments, with a privileged constituency and its own incentives and 
bureaucratic interests, the model can explain the four key stylized facts of 
decentralization in Bolivia.  The first of these, significant changes in the sectoral 
composition of investment, occurs because the center has different preferences from the 
periphery, and – moreover – can increase its own welfare by failing to ascertain the sorts 
of investment that the periphery prefers.  This comes out of the structure of the model, 
and can be interpreted as the straightforward result of differing spatial preferences in a 
political context of competition over resources.  If large construction companies and oil 
& gas firms are based in the capital, for example, the center will naturally prefer 
resource-rich transport and energy projects to health and education, regardless of where 
the latter are physically located.23 
                                                 
23 This is obviously a simplification of how central government works.  A more 
nuanced view would begin recognizing that it is not the residents of the capital per se, 
but those interests able to organize and place representatives in the capital that benefit 
disproportionately.  Faguet (2001) provides a more sophisticated model along these 
lines. 
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 The second stylized fact – severe inequality in the geographic concentration of 
investment, including the complete abandonment of half the country’s municipalities – 
can be explained by the center’s preference for accumulating resources in the capital in a 
context where few other districts have significant political weight.  Over time, the 
cumulative effect of both types of choices will be a concentration of wealth and 
infrastructure in a small number of places at the expense of everywhere else.  
Widespread regressiveness in terms of need and wealth logically follow, hence stylized 
facts (iii) and (iv). 
 Now return for a moment to the broader decentralization debate.  As noted 
above, the policy discussion continues to wander fruitlessly along paths that are both 
well-trodden and confused.  There is no resolution in large part because both concepts – 
centralization and decentralization – are unstable in the literature.  Hence the dozens of 
studies that begin with multiple definitions of “decentralization”, inevitably including 
under the same rubric such disparate phenomena as devolution, delegation, 
deconcentration and privatization (e.g. Rondinelli et.al. 1984; Ostrom et.al. 1993).  
These four concepts – to go no further – are fundamentally different, and to treat them as 
synonymous drains the term “decentralization” of any useful meaning.  The resulting 
conflation of data from dissimilar social experiments leads inevitably to indeterminate, 
contradictory evidence such as that which fills most of our literature.  This goes a long 
way towards explaining why scores of decentralization studies have yielded so little 
knowledge about what it can and cannot achieve. 
 It is here that the most important contribution of this paper lies: in its 
characterization of centralized and decentralized government, and the fundamental 
difference between the two.  As conceived in the model, the key difference between the 
two regimes is the question of residual power.  In the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz 
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(1972), Hart (1995), Williamson (1995) and others, residual power here refers to 
authority over all resources which are not explicitly allocated.  In a democratic system, 
many public resources will be explicitly allocated to particular uses and places as a result 
of political negotiation (legislative bargaining above).  Those with authority to dispose 
freely of all remaining resources hold residual power.  The key question of 
decentralization is thus where residual power lies. 
 Decentralization can accordingly be defined as the division of the national 
resource pool amongst a country’s subnational districts, and the allocation of residual 
powers to independent and accountable governments in each.  Residual power is spread 
throughout the system, even if resources are distributed unevenly.  By contrast, the 
definition of centralization is that both resources and residual power are consolidated 
into national-level aggregates.  This vastly increases the premium to holding residual 
power, and vastly increases the bargaining power of the district where it lies.  In this 
context it is not surprising that the capital in a centralized system will benefit 
disproportionately from the division of the pie.  This simple fact explains three of the 
four main results of decentralization in Bolivia; the fourth, needs-responsiveness, falls 
neatly out of the model. 
 The lesson that emerges is a simple one: residual power must lie in the periphery 
in order for a system to be decentralized.  Where this is not the case, the country in 
question is not decentralized and should not be studied as if it were.  This is true 
regardless of whether it has been deconcentrated, delegated, privatized, or any of a 
number of other categories that fill the public management taxonomy. 
 Lastly, the most interesting results that emerge from the model hinge upon the 
question of credible commitment.  In the real world, the mechanisms used and the 
degrees of commitment achieved appear to vary greatly across countries.  In countries 
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without a strong and independent judiciary, where the constitution does not protect 
districts, and/or where institutions are too weak to oppose the political will of the 
executive, the model would predict resource accumulation in the capital, with 
considerably less accruing to the periphery.  Nigeria, Mexico, Egypt, Thailand, and until 
recently Bolivia would seem to be a few examples.  Elsewhere, however, the 
mechanisms of government seem designed to produce a different outcome. In Europe for 
example, regional aid and structural funds are explicitly designed to favor poorer 
countries and regions, which on the whole receive more EU funds than they pay in.  
Indeed, the fact that European integration is advancing slowly, within the framework of 
institutions where national interests are finely balanced and an elaborate set of side 
agreements and opt-outs exist, suggests that nations are aware of the danger of central 
confiscation and keen to avert it.  Similar claims can be made for the distribution of 
federal funds among US states and German länder, where the rights and privileges of 
states and länder are enshrined in law and safeguarded by the constitution. 
 The fact that all three of these examples are federations of strong regions with 
comparatively weak centers, and the previous examples are the opposite,  suggests that a 
robust legal and institutional framework can help to protect the power of the periphery 
against central encroachment.  The unification of Germany and attendant relocation of 
the capital to Berlin could be seen in this context as a social experiment, a tug-of-war 
between an entrenched framework favoring the regions and an ascendant “new” capital 
which unites the economic, cultural and social elite of the nation.  A number of past and 
present wars may also be understood in this light.  The North and South American wars 
of independence, wars of decolonization, the US Civil War, and the recent wars of 
Yugoslav disintegration, may be viewed to varying degrees as violent attempts by 
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regions to throw off the yoke of central governments that ignore their preferences and 
expropriate their resources. 
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